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China’s Maritime Silk Road and Small States: Lessons from the Case of Djibouti 
 
David Styan* 




This article sheds light on the factors shaping China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) 
in small states through a study of Djibouti and the MSRI.  It also analyses the establishment 
of China’s first overseas military base and thus evaluates the military-security implications of 
Chinese MSRI ports.  Among other things, it shows that we need to conceive the locational 
value of MSRI participants more richly, that the existence of an authoritarian partner has 
advantages for China, but does not necessarily drive MSRI activities, and that small MSRI 
states have agency vis-à-vis China.  It suggests, too, there is a template of Chinese port 
development and that it should not be assumed that China is intentionally wielding the “debt 
trap” to gain equity. 
                                                            






This article provides comparative insight into the evolution of the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) via a detailed analysis of Chinese investment in one key hub on the Maritime Silk 
Road (MSR). It analyses how and why diminutive Djibouti became such a strategically 
significant state for Chinese companies, the government, and the Chinese navy. Since 2013 
China has invested heavily in Djibouti’s ports and railway, rapidly transforming the Red Sea 
state into a key logistical hub for a wide range of Chinese trade, investment and naval 
activities on the MSR. As such, Djibouti’s case appears comparable to maritime hubs on the 
MSR in Asia; most explicitly Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka 
as in Djibouti, a state-owned enterprise (SOE), China Merchants Group (CMG), is the 
leading investor in port and free zone development. In Djibouti as in Hambantota, debt to 
China has become a major policy issue. In 2017 CMG acquired a 99-year lease on the port of 
Hambantota partly in exchange for unpaid Sri Lankan state debt. This has sparked wider 
debate about how China will manage any subsequent debt defaults on infrastructure projects 
in Africa. This text provides comparative insights context from Djibouti on the evolution and 
composition of Chinese investments and debt.  
 
The text also examines China’s rationale for establishing its first permanent overseas naval 
facility in Djibouti in August 2017. Does this stem from the extensive Chinese commercial 
investments in the region, broader geo-strategic rivalry with the US and other powers, or 
other factors? A key question for students of Chinese foreign policy and the MSR Initiative 
(MSRI) is whether there are unique factors underpinning China’s naval ties with Djibouti: 
will it remain the only “military hub” on the MSR? Or will other key ports such as Gwadar in 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka’s Hambantota, or berths in the Seychelles or Maldives follow the 
precedent set in Djibouti?  
 
We consider two main variables that might inform the future trajectory of China’s 
involvement with other strategically placed ports on the MSR.  The first variable is a state’s 
geo-strategic location.  In Djibouti’s case, this driver seems pertinent given it lies at the 
intersection of shipping lanes of vital importance for both western economies and China 
because these lanes are a corridor for Europe’s imports and oil.  Additionally, Djibouti sits 
astride fiber-optic cable lanes which provide the backbone of global telecommunications. 
These follow the shipping lanes across the Gulf of Aden, with three existing international 
cables meeting just south of Bab al-Mandab.  It is hardly surprising that China, following 
other global powers in the region, devotes military attention and resources to such a state. 
 
The second variable considered the state’s domestic political context. Logically, one might 
expect China, other factors being equal, to be able to implement MSRI projects (including 
associated military initiatives) with authoritarian leaders most straightforwardly, given the 
political wherewithal of authoritarian governments to embrace and implement the MSRI 
without constraints.  After all, the rotation of leaders in democracies may produce newly 
elected governments that question or cancel MSRI contracts. This has happened in Sri Lanka 
in 2015 and the Maldives and Malaysia in 2018.  Furthermore, authoritarian leaders have the 
ability to hide the terms of MSRI and military agreements and activities associated with 
them, allowing for certain “flexibilities.”  With respect to Djibouti, President Ismael Omar 
Guelleh, has held power since 1999. He faces little opposition, rules over a tiny population 
via extensive powers of patronage and has considerable experience in negotiating with major 




Djibouti became a formal partner of the MSRI on 2 September 2018, following a meeting 
between Djibouti’s President Ismael Omar Guelleh and his Chinese counterpart President Xi 
Jinping in Beijing. The next day, addressing the seventh Forum on China African 
Cooperation (FOCAC), President Guelleh stated:  
[W]e have greatly benefited from Chinese investments in our ports, railways, 
and roads […] the One Belt, One Road Initiative is, therefore, the key to 
furthering our growth agenda and we are delighted that our region will 
continue to benefit from its many advantages.1 
 
Ten months earlier, in November 2017, Djibouti’s prominent position on the MSR was 
reflected in China’s high-profile reception of the Djiboutian President during a state visit to 
Beijing, the first foreign head of state to be received by Xi Jinping following the 19th 
national congress of the Communist Party of China.  
 
Beyond investigating the potential relevance of the aforementioned two variables, this text 
also analyzes how a key Chinese company on the MSR globally—China Merchants Group—
pioneered commercial investment in Djibouti’s Ports and Free Zone Authority (DPFZA) and 
its facilities. In so doing, it sheds light on the motivations of Chinese state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in the MSRI, which have been charged with acting based on political considerations 
and gives us a sense of what forms MSRI projects might take elsewhere.  Interestingly, we 
see the application of a standard “template” of MSR investment (mirroring very similar 
Chinese port strategies at Colombo and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, for example) as well as 
indications of newer MSRI components, notably involving Chinese telecoms and e-payments 
investors such as Chongqing-based IZP.  
 
The last major theme that this article covers is negotiations over China’s naval access to 
Djibouti. The value of this is to make clearer the position of MSRI participant countries.  
Conventional wisdom is that they must bow to the dictates of Beijing given their relative 
weakness vis-à-vis China.  However, this text shows the situation actually may be much more 
complex given the diverse bargaining assets of states.  Regarding Djibouti, this analysis 
highlights that Djibouti’s stable, patronage-based government has extensive prior experience 
and skill in negotiating similar access with other global powers.  It argues that China’s naval 
presence in Djibouti reflects a double paradox. Firstly, despite Djibouti’s diminutive size and 
lack of material resources, its government had a relatively strong hand when China came to 
negotiate the construction of naval facilities in Djibouti in 2014-17.2 Equally paradoxically, it 
was more straightforward and less controversial internationally, for China to establish its first 
overseas military facility directly alongside other major powers, rather than in a state with no 
history of hosting foreign forces. 
 
                                                            
1 Guelleh, Ismail Omar, Speech to FOCAC Summit, September 3, 2018, accessed September 
15, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/PAGEOFFICIELLEIOG/posts/2050264555023907. 
2 By 2018 ‘The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Support Base in Djibouti’ was state 
media’s preferred English nomenclature. The terms ‘logistics’ or ‘support facility’ invariably 
being preferred by Chinese media to the more conventional ‘military base’. 
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The article draws on a range of secondary sources and the author’s own research in the 
region; it is the first article to attempt to analyze Djibouti’s role within the MSRI.3 It is 
structured in the four sections. Section one briefly sketches a chronology of the evolution of 
political and economic ties between Beijing and Djibouti before analyzing the degree to 
which political and security cooperation in the maritime domain preceded major projects in 
port and railway infrastructure as part of the MSRI since 2013.  Section two then examines 
these specific projects in detail, noting that these are designed primarily to accelerate China-
Ethiopia economic ties, rather than develop Djibouti per-se. Section three outlines the recent, 
rapid evolution of China’s military and naval logistics facility in Djibouti.  Section four then 
evaluates the overall argument and key variables shaping bilateral ties, examining what 
insights from China’s investment in Djibouti might be applicable to other small states on the 
MSR. 
 
Djibouti: background and historical links with China  
 
Small states on the MSR: Djibouti, patronage & geo-strategy  
 
Despite the “win-win” rhetoric about partnerships between China and small states along the 
MSR, one of the key challenges for Beijing has been the disparate size and political systems 
of the states in which it has invested. Malaysia and Sri Lanka both have sizable populations 
and pluralist polities, whereas the Maldives has less than half a million people and a highly 
unstable, fractious polity.  Djibouti also has a population of around a million, but appears a 
highly stable, Presidential polity with a tiny electorate.   
 
Djibouti gained political independence from France only in 1977. It has a minuscule GDP, in 
both absolute and per-capita terms. Djibouti owes both its existence and its current diplomatic 
significance for Beijing to its strategic location. Its territories overlook the southern entrance 
to the Red Sea and provide a natural port and railhead for its giant neighbor Ethiopia. Both 
factors are central to understanding the pivotal position that it plays for China.  France ruled 
Djibouti from the late 19th century but retained considerable influence. French forces were 
scaled back in the 1990s, yet Djibouti remains France’s largest military base in Africa. 
French troops underpin the EU’s anti-piracy force in Djibouti and cooperate closely with US 
forces; they also manage the firing ranges and desert training facilities now being used by 
Chinese forces.  
 
Two, interlinked domestic political characteristics are of relevance to the analysis of 
Djibouti’s bilateral ties with China. Firstly, power is highly personalized. President Guelleh’s 
control rests on a patronage-based polity. Economic “rents” accrue from foreign military 
bases and access to economic assets, particularly port fees. Revenues are then redistributed to 
maintain control and legitimacy. Secondly, this patronage-based political system in part 
accounts for Djibouti’s unusual flexibility and innovation in terms of foreign policy. Nimble, 
often personalized foreign policy has repeatedly generated significant political and economic 
capital from inauspicious foundations – most recently in relation to China.  Thus Djibouti’s 
                                                            
3 Literature on Djiboutian foreign policy is rare; see Sonia Le Gouriellec, ‘Djibouti's Foreign 
Policy in International Institutions: The Big Diplomacy of a Small State’, in African Foreign 
Policies in International Institutions, eds. Jason Warner, Timothy M. Shaw, (London: 
Palgrave, 2018); David Styan, ‘Djibouti; small state strategy at a crossroads’, Third World 
Thematics 1(1), (2016),pp. 79-91; David Styan, Djibouti; changing influence in the Horn’s 
strategic hub, (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 2013).  
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power and influence is disproportionately greater than the state’s small size and ostensibly 
“dependent” roles would suggest. Influence is magnified through diplomatic presence in 
international fora, notably the African Union, the Arab League and La Francophonie 
grouping of French-speaking states.4 
 
Schematically, Djibouti’s regional and foreign policy roles can be viewed in four distinct 
ways. First, Djibouti is a bilateral bridge providing access to the sea for the Horn’s regional 
hegemon, neighboring Ethiopia, whose foreign trade has overwhelmingly transited via 
Djibouti since the closure of Eritrea’s ports by the Ethio-Eritrean border war of 1998. This 
bridge (or corridor) perspective is central to the argument about the sub-regional 
characteristics of MSRI investment in Djibouti; rail, port and pipeline projects all reinforcing 
this aspect. 
 
Second, corresponding more closely to Djibouti’s own official “Vision 2035” economic 
development framework, is its role as a gateway to the wider region. This is premised on the 
successful growth model of ‘port-cities’ such as Dubai and Singapore.5  The vision promotes 
Djibouti as the Horn’s natural regional and logistical hub. Although it pre-dates the China’s 
MSRI, the vision effectively shares its “gateway” notion of linking Africa to world markets, 
the commercial objectives of CMG and the “connectivity” rationale of the MSR more 
broadly.  The third dimension has sought to revive Djibouti’s status as a maritime logistical 
hub for container transshipments.  This has been most explicit since the 2008 opening by 
DPFZA of the Doraleh Container Terminal port, managed and part-owned by Dubai Ports 
World (DPW). This marketing of Djibouti as a global container port and hub emphasizes 
Djibouti’s centrality to trade flows between Asia, Africa and Europe. Djibouti’s relations 
with DPW soured after 2012 due to politically-charged legal issues. These ultimately resulted 
in the Djiboutian government nationalizing the port and revoking DPW’s management 
license in 2018. China’s MSRI investment thus offers an opportune alternative source of port 
finance and links to China’s global shipping networks.  
 
This role has been both reconfigured and boosted by the significant investment of China in 
infrastructure within both Djibouti and Ethiopia between 2012-18. There has been an abrupt 
shift from Djibouti’s Arab partners (particularly the United Arab Emirates, owners of DPW) 
to Chinese and other Asian partners in terms of who promotes and funds this vision. The shift 
has mirrored the growth in economic and political ties between Beijing and Djibouti and the 
growth of MSRI-related investments in Djibouti; most notably the railway, Multi-Purpose 
Port and International Free Zone discussed below. For Djibouti, the MSR has greatly 
amplified long-standing aims both to consolidate the state’s role as the Horn’s pre-eminent 
port, and to boost its status as a transshipment hub. 
 
The fourth aspect of foreign policy is Djibouti’s unique role as host to China’s only military 
facility on the MSR.  Five years ago this author argued Djibouti was fast becoming an 
“international maritime and military laboratory” spawning new networks of naval, military 
and surveillance cooperation, both among NATO forces (above all United States/US, French 
                                                            
4 For details; see Le Gouriellec ‘Djibouti's Foreign Policy, p. 399; Styan, Small state 
strategy. 




and EU), and between them and diverse Asian powers.6  This trend has greatly accelerated in 
the intervening years with China’s promotion of the MSRI and the establishment of China’s 
naval facility in Doraleh in 2017.  
 
Chronology and context: China’s relations with Djibouti  
 
Djibouti’s ties with China with can be divided into three phases. The first phase opened with 
Djibouti establishing formal diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
in January 1979. The republic’s first President, Hassan Gouled Aptidon, made the first of 
three state visits to Beijing later in 1979. In terms of Beijing’s overall Africa policy, for two 
decades, there was nothing remarkable about ties with Djibouti, which barely feature in a 
comprehensive 2009 overview of Chinese aid to Africa.7 A second phase witnessed the start 
of Chinese anti-piracy patrols. The elderly President Aptidon was replaced by his nephew, 
Ismael Omar Guelleh in 1999. Guelleh made an official visit to China in 2001 and attended 
his first Beijing FOCAC summit in November 2006. Closer contemporary bilateral relations 
was anchored primarily in maritime logistics; Djibouti’s port providing bunkering and 
services for the growing number of Chinese ships transiting the Gulf of Aden (Djibouti’s 
importance for western and Asian navies grew as Aden, the region’s principal port became 
increasingly dangerous; in October 2000 Al-Qaeda attacked the USS Cole there). This factor 
reflected the Chinese navy’s strategy of using anti-piracy as a springboard to a global 
presence. In 2008, China launched its first anti-piracy missions in the Indian Ocean and Gulf 
of Aden; its marines exchanging fire with Somali pirates for the first time in January 2009.8 
Yet it would be incorrect to say that China’s anti-piracy activities in the region from 2008 
immediately prompted close bilateral ties.  Beyond anti-piracy patrols, delegation visits were 
rare and there was no Chinese military attaché in Djibouti.  However, ties were upgraded in 
July 2012, during President Guelleh’s second state-visit, to the 5th FOCAC conference. This 
led to the establishment of a bilateral ‘Joint Ministerial Commission’ and the deepening of 
civil, naval and military ties. These in turn reflected Beijing’s formulation of MSRI strategies 
in 2013 and the acceleration of infrastructure investments in the Horn of Africa as a whole. 
 
The contemporary period of bilateral ties, 2012-19, has been marked by growing MSR 
investment and broader ‘strategic alliance’. The July 2012 meetings came as Ethiopia, China, 
and Djibouti agreed to fund the renovation of the Ethio-Djibouti railway and construct 
associated port-facilities in Djibouti. Ethiopia had long sought to renovate the dilapidated 
French rail line to Djibouti’s port. The aforementioned closure of Eritrea’s ports to Ethiopian 
trade, coupled with Ethiopia’s accelerating economic growth prompted severe bottlenecks in 
Djibouti’s ports. Despite numerous previous Western and multilateral feasibility studies, 
funding was not forthcoming prior to China’s 2012 offer.  
 
China and MSRI infrastructure projects in Djibouti   
 
                                                            
6 Styan, Djibouti; changing influence, p. 12. 
7 Deborah Brautingam. The dragon’s gift; the real story of China in Africa. (Oxford: OUP, 
2009), p. 83. 
8 Andrew S. Erickson and Austin Strange. Six Years at Sea... and Counting: Gulf of Aden 




The contemporary phase of bilateral ties between China and Djibouti comprises four distinct 
components.  Firstly, at the heart of the relationship are the two infrastructure projects 
integral to the MSRI in the Horn of Africa: the Ethio-Djiboutian railway and the Multi-
Purpose Port (MPP) at Doraleh in Djibouti. This connects the rail project to the Red Sea, 
Suez and the Indian Ocean. In addition, China has also constructed several small ports and a 
vast water conduit from Ethiopia.  South of Djibouti’s capital, an oil terminal and Sino-
Djiboutian Liquid Natural Gas plant are also under construction. This will be linked to 
Chinese-funded hydrocarbon development in Ethiopia’s southeastern Ogaden region via a 
pipeline.9  The second component of China’s ties with Djibouti comprises direct ownership of 
Djiboutian assets. In 2013 the state-owned CMG purchased almost a quarter of the shares in 
Djibouti’s port authority.  Three years later, it sought a similar equity slice of Ethiopian 
Shipping Lines, the Ethiopian state-owned shipping company whose vessels use Djibouti as 
their home-port. Thirdly, the number of programs in Djibouti funded with Chinese aid have 
sharply increased. These include new educational facilities and scholarships, a state-of-the art 
Diplomatic Institute for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a new military hospital, and telecoms 
and military assistance.  The fourth and final component comprises China’s first permanent 
overseas naval facility, located alongside China’s new MPP.   
 
China and the Djibouti-Ethiopia rail-link  
 
The ‘strategic partnership’ which has evolved over the last five years reflects the fact that 
since 2012 China’s has become Djibouti’s largest inward investor, thanks largely to the 
aforementioned rail link to Addis Ababa, with its associated infrastructure, and the 
aforementioned MPP, with its associated Djibouti International Free Trade Zone (FTZ).  The 
backbone of China’s investment in the Horn is the renovated Ethio-Djibouti railway. Full 
commercial services began in 2018. At its inauguration in 2016, China’s ambassador to 
Ethiopia La Yifan claimed: ‘[I]t is the first standard gauge electrified railroad on the 
continent built with Chinese standards and technology, and certainly it will not be the last.’10 
The 756 kilometer railway is poised to enhance regional economic integration in the Horn.  
The railway is arguably the most substantive, tangible component of the MSRI in East Africa 
to date. Its role is not simply to facilitate trade via the ports in Djibouti, but to provide 
Ethiopia’s burgeoning industrial zones—part-planned and financed by China, now occupied 
by Chinese and other companies producing for a global market—with a maritime outlet.  
 
The China-led renovation project cost an estimated $3.5 billion, financed 70 percent by China 
Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) and 30 percent by the Ethiopian government, for the 
650km tranche which traverses Ethiopia. The final 100km segment in Djibouti was also built 
by China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC), but under a separate contract which the 
Djiboutian government initialed in February 2012. Valued at $505 million, wrangles 
subsequently emerged in 2015 over whether the Djiboutian government or China was 
responsible for the costs of electrifying the line. This was resolved via the CRCC taking an 
equity stake in Djibouti’s portion of the rail operating company.  This incident suggests 
                                                            
9 Led by China’s Poly CGL Group, see: ‘Réalisation d’une série d’accords entre le 
gouvernement djiboutien et le Group chinois Poly CGL’, [‘A series of agreements between 
the Djiboutian government and the Chinese group Poly CGL’], Agence Djiboutienne 
d’Information, May 13, 2018, accessed September 15, 2018, http://www.adi.dj/. 
10 ‘Ethiopia-Djibouti railway inaugurated’, Railway Gazette, October 5, 2016.  
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limited financial foresight and skill from the Djiboutian government in negotiating Chinese 
contracts.11 
 
Analyzing the financing and management of the railway also underscores the problematic 
asymmetries in trying to understand China-Ethiopian ties separately from those with Djibouti. 
In the Ethiopian case, the Addis-Djibouti railway is just one component in an ambitious 
national rail expansion plan. The same Chinese companies who built the Djibouti line had 
also constructed the Addis Ababa’s Urban Light Railway system, inaugurated in late 2015.12 
 
China’s Doraleh MPP Facility 
 
Commercially the MSRI is, above all, about aligning the ‘connectivity’ of global shipping 
lanes and ports and with Chinese capital.  The new Chinese owned and constructed Doraleh 
MPP encompasses container, general and bulk cargo facilities. Work on the port began in 
mid-2013. The inauguration of the port was held on 24 May 2017 in the presence of the 
CEOs of major Chinese construction and maritime corporations, including CMG and Dalian 
Ports. The 1.2 km quayside provide deep-water moorings that can accommodate up to six of 
the world’s largest cargo ships simultaneously.13  The MPP cost $590 million, jointly 
financed by DPFZA and CMG, consolidating CMG’s role on the MSR.14 
 
Contractually the Doraleh MPP is separate from the surrounding Djibouti International FTZ 
(DIFTZ).  However, Chinese management of the DIFTZ was announced in January 2016, at 
the same time as new regulatory frameworks for Chinese banks and transshipment companies 
operating in Djibouti. The first phase of DIFTZ opened in July 2018.  If and when it is 
completed DIFTZ will encompass 4,800 hectares and cost $3.5 billion; the largest FTZ on 
the continent.  Such FTZs are an integral part of the MSRI and in terms of the Horn of 
Africa are planned to be linked by road and rail to inland logistics centers close to Chinese 
industrial parks in highland Ethiopia. DIFTZ enhances China’s commercial presence in the 
Red Sea, COSCO and other Chinese companies having established comparable ports closer 
to Suez, further north in the Red Sea.15 While the rail and port investments are key elements 
in the MSRI, Djibouti hosts a third significant Chinese project, the $340 million (95 percent 
covered by China Ex-Im Bank loans) aqueduct between Ethiopia and Djibouti. This is 
                                                            
11 Except as otherwise noted, all amounts herein are in United States dollars (USD). 
12 On Ethiopia’s broader ties with China, see Aaron Tesfaye, ‘Ethiopia, China and the West’ 
in China and Africa; building peace and security cooperation on the continent, eds. Chris 
Alden et al. (London: Palgrave, 2017). 
13 ‘Djibouti's Doraleh Port officially opens’, Xinhua, May 24, 2017, accessed September 15, 
2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/24/c_136312120.htm. 
14 For details of CMG’s global role in the MSRI see: Mathieu Duchatel and Alexandre 
Sheldon Duplaix, Blue China: navigating the maritime silk road to Europe. (Brussels: 
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2018), p. 15. 
15 China has invested in Egypt’s Port Said and al-Adabiya facilities. David Shinn, ‘China’s 
Power Projection in the Western Indian Ocean’, China Brief 4, (2017), accessed September 
15, 2018, https://international.thenewslens.com/article/66502 
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capable of piping 100,000 m2 per day of water to alleviate arid Djibouti’s acute water 
shortages. Ethiopia already supplies Djibouti with hydro-electricity.16   
 
Outlining the specific MSRI projects above, it is worth stressing that, there is a complete 
absence of critical public policy debate within the country on any aspects of the MSRI, be 
they good or bad, largely because public discourse is tightly controlled. Domestic media 
consists uniquely of state-owned TV, radio and press agency reports. This reflects the highly 
controlled patronage nature of public and political life more generally in a state with a tiny 
salaried elite, almost entirely dependent upon employment in the civil service.  Moreover, 
there are no fora for airing debates or grievances; ‘civil society’ or think-tanks are non-
existent, unlike in neighboring Ethiopia. Thus there is an absence of critical discourse on 
practical aspects of the impact of the MSRI, notably the impact of Chinese investment on job 
creation. The MSRI has brought relatively little employment to Djibouti; CMG and state 
construction companies importing the bulk of their labor.  Nor is there debate on the 
environmental impact of infrastructure works on the Doraleh littoral, or Djibouti’s growing 
debt burden owed to China.17 
 
This, quiescent aspect of domestic political life Djibouti clearly underpins our second 
variable, the manner in which local politics influences Chinese interaction with the state 
authorities.  China has been able to build-up extensive ties with the Djiboutian President, his 
ministers and wider government, without attracting critical attention from within the country. 
Given the longstanding presence of numerous other foreign military bases in the country, nor 
is the arrival of Chinese troops controversial domestically.    
 
China’s naval and military facilities in Djibouti  
 
The text’s second analytical concern is to examine China’s rationale in opening its first 
permanent overseas naval facility in August 2017. Here both geostrategic and domestic 
political variables are clearly of some relevance. Chinese authorities routinely deny any direct 
linkage between the MSR and the increasingly global reach of China’s navy, the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Thus, in Beijing’s version, the establishment of a permanent 
naval “logistics center” in Djibouti reflects not the country’s status as a MSR hub, but rather 
the PLAN’s decade-long engagement in multilateral anti-piracy operations in the region and 
China’s broader commercial and multilateral international engagements.  
 
However, the PLAN base nestles alongside CMG’s vast new MPP and they share quaysides. 
Thus in practice the military and civil aspects are intertwined. PLAN’s presence in Djibouti 
puts into practice Beijing’s 2015 Military Strategy white paper. This projected PLAN’s role 
as protecting strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), maintaining anti-piracy 
operations around the Horn of Africa, and supporting an enlarged Chinese role in 
                                                            
16 ‘Chinese funded Ethio-Djibouti water project…’, Construction Review, June 27, 
2017,accessed September 15, 2018, https://constructionreviewonline.com/2017/06/chinese-
funded-ethio-djibouti-water-project-to-be-inaugurated-soon. 
17 The one exception concerns the controversial activities of Chinese fishing vessels in 
Djiboutian waters. ‘Chinese trawlers snapped fishing in Djibouti’s protected waters’, France 




international peacekeeping.18  In local terms China is only the most recent military arrival in 
Djibouti’s crowded military real-estate market, much of it developed as a result of 
multilateral anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden. Somewhat paradoxically, it is precisely 
the presence of a range other great powers with bases in Djibouti which has led to the 
development of China’s facility. China is just one of many participants, both in regional anti-
piracy activities and within a broader equation of “base politics” in the region.  
 
In the past decade, the longstanding French garrison has been supplemented by the arrival of 
other foreign powers; the US’s AFRICOM facility, the EU anti-piracy force EUNAVFOR, 
Japan and now China all establishing bases in the decade 2008-17. This can be usefully 
contrasted with the dynamics of great-power rivalry for influence in Central Asia during the 
same period.  Here southern states of the former Soviet Union such as Kyrgyzstan sought to 
play-off Moscow, Washington, and Beijing as each searched for influence and military access 
to the strategically important region, bordering Afghanistan.  However, writing about great 
power rivalry in Central Asia, in 2012, Cooley argued that: “[T]he interaction among the 
United States, Russia, and China in the region has intensified over the decade, but that the 
zero-sum ‘competition’ and the pursuit of relative gains has not been the exclusive nor even 
the dominant form of great power interaction. All three powers have forged tactical 
partnership with the other members of the ‘strategic triangle’.” 19 
 
As explained below, this phenomena of partnership and cooperation has been even more 
pronounced in the Horn of Africa. President Guelleh first hinted at a possible Chinese 
military presence in Djibouti to journalists in April 2015.  Just a week after US Secretary of 
State John Kerry had made his inaugural visit to Djibouti that May, Guelleh confirmed the 
Chinese plan.  The fact that the US opposed China’s presence in Djibouti, but had to coexist 
at close quarters with China (the bases are barely 12km apart) goes the heart of the argument 
that Djibouti’s President wields considerable influence.  In negotiating the terms of China’s 
navy’s construction of its logistics facility in Djibouti in 2014-15, President Guelleh and his 
entourage were able to draw on earlier experience hammering-out the financial and legal 
terms of agreements with western powers. Similarly, allowing China to construct a base 
adjacent to western facilities simultaneously increased Djibouti’s negotiating power – and 
base rent rates – vis-à-vis the US and other allies; while concurrently strengthening the 
independence and leverage of Djiboutian foreign policy.  In this sense, both of our variables, 
Djibouti’s geostrategic position, and its leaders’ political longevity and experience of 
negotiating military access, gave it greater leverage than other states negotiating with China 
along the MSRI, such as Sri Lanka, Myanmar or the Maldives 20  Comparatively, Djibouti 
has thus been in a relatively strong position re China.  In the cases of both Sri Lanka and the 
Maldives, the principal ‘counter-power’ is India. However, Indian interests have been such 
                                                            
18 PRC, State Council, China’s Military Strategy (Beijing, 2015). English version: accessed 
January 15, 2019, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-05/26/content_20820628.htm,  
19 Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central 
Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 7. 
20 For comparative studies of the MSR and such states, see Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, (ed.) 
China’s maritime silk road initiative and South-East Asia (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2018); Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, ‘China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative and Southeast Asia: a 
Chinese ‘pond’ not ‘lake’ in the Works’, Journal of Contemporary China 27(111), (2018), 
pp. 329-343,   
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that neither government has been able to systematically play New Delhi off against Beijing 
for financial benefit.   
 
China’s naval base is in practice a heavily-militarized annex alongside the Doraleh civilian 
MPP, built and managed by CMG. The opening ceremony in August 2017 was covered 
extensively in both western and Chinese media; China’s coverage emphasizing Djibouti’s 
links to the MSR framework. 21  The facility can accommodate up to 400 marines and 
comprises ammunition depots, an office complex, a heliport with a short airstrip, and other 
facilities.22  PLAN ships can moor at the vast Chinese (CMG)-owned quayside a few hundred 
meters away, which is large enough to accommodate all but two ships in China’s fleet.23 By  
2019 a separate jetty had also been constructed  linked directly to the base. In April 2018 
President Guelleh stated China was paying $20 million annually for the facility, noting that 
the Chinese base is barely a tenth the size of the US facility at Camp Lemonnier, for which 
they pay $60 million per annum.24 The reality is that such revenues are neither transparent 
nor publicly audited, again reinforcing the argument that the highly centralized, patronage-
based polity enables Guelleh to exercise considerable autonomy in his dealings with rival 
foreign powers; playing one off against another.  
 
China itself has advanced several reasons for opening a naval facility. In November 2016, a 
defense ministry spokesman said China planned to use the base to better implement its 
international obligations and to protect the nation’s overseas interests but not to seek ‘military 
expansion.’  Four distinct roles and rationales for the base are prominent in China’s public 
discourse.  The first is to bolster and protect China’s fast growing portfolio of investments in 
the region.  Secondly, anti-piracy operations have been central to China’s role in the region. 
The base enhances technical support to Chinese anti-piracy and other naval and merchant 
vessels in the region. A third factor is the increased presence of Chinese nationals in Africa 
and the Middle East. During the 2011 war in Libya the Chinese government found itself 
                                                            
21 For example: ‘PLA establishes base in Horn of Africa’, Chinese News Agency, July 12, 
2017, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2017-07/12/content_4785301.htm; ‘China stages 1st live 
fire drills at overseas base in Djibouti’, Russia Today, September 27, 2017, 
https://www.rt.com/news/404593-china-military-drills-djibouti/, all accessed September 15, 
2018.  
22 See: Bhat, Col. Vinayak, ‘China’s mega fortress in Djibouti could be model for its bases in 
Pakistan’, September, 27, 2017, accessed September 15, 2018, 
https://theprint.in/security/china-mega-fortress-djibouti-pakistan/11031. 
23 Erica Downs, Jeffrey Becker and Patrick de Gategn. China’s Military Support Facility in 
Djibouti: The Economic and Security Dimensions of China’s First Overseas Base. 
(Washington D.C.: Centre for Naval Analyses, July 2017), p. 6.  
24 For a French view, see Sébastien Le Belzic, ‘Chronique - Djibouti, l’avant-poste militaire 
de la Chine en Afrique’[‘Djibouti, China’s outpost in Africa’], Le Monde, July 17, 2017, 
accessed 15 Spetember 2018, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/07/17/djibouti-l-
avant-poste-militaire-de-la-chine-en-afrique_5161535_3212.html.  President Guelleh gave 
the base rental figures in an interview with Jeune Afrique, ‘Ismaïl Omar Guelleh: « Djibouti 





unable to evacuate its citizens without help from western powers; by the 2015 evacuation of 
Yemen, Chinese forces were better prepared.  With far more Chinese living in all the states of 
East Africa, the permanent base and logistics in Djibouti address this weakness. Fourthly, 
China now has a growing number of peacekeepers deployed in multilateral roles, particularly 
with the UN in Africa. In 2017, for example, 1000 served in nearby South Sudan, 600 in 
Liberia, and 400 in Mali. 25 Beijing has pledged to increase these numbers and the Djibouti 
facility clearly enhances China’s ability to project military power in the Red Sea and Indian 
Ocean, and to also deploy troops in Africa. This is the same role Djibouti has long played for 
France and the US. 
 
Critical English-language coverage of China’s military presence has been extensive from 
both US and above all Indian sources.  In 2016 Djiboutian diplomats were responsive to 
western political and media criticism of China’s increasingly assertive role in the Indian 
Ocean. With US senators criticizing China’s presence, in August 2016 Djibouti’s foreign 
minister made a series of statements in Washington aimed at reassuring western allies, 
stating: 
 
We welcome China’s presence in Djibouti, just as we previously welcomed 
forces from the US, NATO, France, the UK, Italy, and Japan, who are present 
in our country. These are vital strategic allies for Djibouti as we fight against 
terrorism and piracy, which remain significant threats to the international 
community and the global economy. 26 
 
President Guelleh echoed this point:  
 
I know there exists an obsession about the Chinese presence. But it is 
unfounded and one-sided. The Chinese don’t have a problem to cohabit with 
westerners in Djibouti, on condition that they don’t constantly spy on their 
installations. However, the Americans are obsessed; they constantly repeat to 
use that the Chinese presence is an irritant for their operations’.27 
 
US-China: rivalry or cooperation in the Red Sea? 
 
Clearly there are US sensitivities over the PLAN’s presence; when US Secretary of State Rex 
Tillerson visited Djibouti in March 2018 he expressed unease over Chinese maritime 
ambitions. These were made more explicit in a hawkish denunciation of China’s role in 
Djibouti in December 2018, as US National Security Advisor John Bolton launched a new 
US Africa strategy. The only physical US-China friction to date arose in May 2018; the US 
accusing the Chinese of attempting to endanger US pilots with weapons-grade lasers, 
                                                            
25 On China’s growing role in peacekeeping, see Chris Alden et al. eds. China and Africa: 
building peace and security cooperation on the continent (London: Palgrave, 2017) 
26 Mahmood, Ali Youssouf. ‘We Welcome China In Djibouti, Just As We Welcomed 
The West’, Defenseone.com, 2016, accessed September 15, 2018, 
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/08/we-welcome-china-djibouti-just-we-welcomed-
west/130765/. 
27 Le Belzic, ‘Djibouti, l’avant-poste militaire de la Chine….’ 
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something Beijing strenuously denied. 28 The notion that such conflict is inevitable appears 
misplaced. Regionally, Chinese and western agendas are allied, aiming both to ensure 
freedom of navigation and to manage regional threats. China was a major investor in Yemen, 
including in the port of Aden, and has played an active diplomatic role there since 2015. Like 
the US, it also has close economic and political ties to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the main 
combatants in Yemen. Djibouti’s tight, congested airspace and port facilities necessitate tacit 
cooperation and Chinese, US, Japanese and EU vessels also all share the same refueling 
facilities. In practice, the French military still manages key local military zones. China is 
simply the latest customer to use Djibouti’s remote firing ranges and rugged battle training 
zones.  China’s navy generated both domestic and international legitimacy during a decade of 
cooperation over anti-piracy activities in the region. It is plausible may that its new base in 
Djibouti will act as much as a fulcrum for quiet multilateral military cooperation with NATO 
powers, as a new geostrategic point of tension. 
 
Djibouti: broader policy lessons applicable to small state on the MSR?  
 
Replicating CMG’s standard Port and Free Zone template in Africa? 
 
A comparative concern for analysts of Chinese port investments in Africa and elsewhere on 
the MSR is the central role of CMG. As noted above, CMG holds a minority stake in the 
national Port Authority and is the main investor in the Doraleh’s MPP and associated DIFTZ; 
it is by far the largest Chinese company operating in Djibouti.  Several analytical questions 
are pertinent to CMG’s role on the MSR. Firstly to what extent is CMG acting as a ‘normal’ 
profit-maximizing commercial concern?  If it is, what time-frame do its shareholders expect 
dividends on large African infrastructure projects with unproven revenue flows?  Secondly, 
as a SOE, are CMG’s actions in Africa and Asia guided primarily by the Chinese state for 
political rather than commercial reasons?  If so, while ostensibly seeking to replicate the 
“Shekou model” across the MSR, CMG seems to have played the role of a vanguard investor 
and foreign-policy coordinator in several key hubs on the MSR. There is relatively little 
literature which seeks to disaggregate disparate Chinese commercial and political interests 
within the overarching MSRI framework.29   
 
Nevertheless, CMG’s role in Djibouti does appear to correspond to a fairly standardized, 
“one-size-fits-all approach” template to port and free zone development construction and 
finance in different locations on the MSR.  The conglomerate’s first ever overseas investment 
was in 2009, in the port of Colombo in Sri Lanka.30 Since then CMG has become a leading 
                                                            
28  On the laser allegations, see: ‘US accuses China …’ BBC, May 4, 2018, accessed 
September 15, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-43999502. 
29 Relatively few scholars have sought to disaggregate foreign policy actors and to date there 
appears to be no firm-level analysis of factors shaping the BRI.  Rare exceptions include Li 
Xue, ‘China's Foreign Policy Decision-Making Mechanism and ‘One Belt One Road’ 
Strategy’, Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies 5(2), (2016), pp. 23-35; Lee Jones and 
Shahar Hameiri, ‘Rising Powers and State Transformation: The Case of China’, European 
Journal of International Affairs 22(1), (2016 pp. 72-98.  
30 Hong Zhang, “Beyond ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy’: The Dissemination of PRC State 





actor on the MSR, with investments in 18 ports worldwide.  French analyst Thierry Pairault 
notes that the role CMG has played in Djibouti largely mirrors that which they played 
elsewhere in Africa, notably in Tangiers in Morocco and Lomé in Togo.31 Subsequent 
prospective port projects - most notably the vast port and free zone in proposed in Bagamoyo, 
close to Zanzibar in Tanzania – does suggest a standardized approach.  32 
 
Djibouti’s development as a hub on the MSRI follows the pattern established in Sri Lanka, 
where CMG invested first in the port of Colombo, and then Hambantota, whose subsequent 
debt and lease-arrangement is outlined below.33  CMG’s role in Djibouti dates from July 
2011 when the para-statal Port Autonome International de Djibouti (PAID) re-assumed direct 
management of its old port facilities within Djibouti-ville. In January 2013 PAID was 
restructured as a private company. CMG acquired a 23.5 percent share, for $85 million, 
alongside the Djiboutian government, the port authority being renamed the Djibouti Port and 
Free Zone Authority (DPFZA).  As the rail and port projects were nearing completion in 
2016-18, CMG assumed a higher profile in bilateral ties. In April 2016 CMG announced a 
‘strategic commercial partnership’ for Djibouti with Qingdao, China’s third largest port. In 
2017, Li Xiaopeng, president of CMG, outlined his vision for Djibouti to China Daily:  
 
Making full use of Djibouti's geographical advantages, we are in the process 
of making the country the ‘Shekou of East Africa,’ a hub for regional 
shipping, logistics and trade. We will use our experience in Shekou and adjust 
the model to local conditions. […] The group wants to use the model of 
Shekou, dubbed ‘Port-Park-City’. 34 
 
Pairault has argued plausibly that Djibouti’s experience of complex, interlocking 
shareholdings of CMG, Dalian ports and - significantly - Chinese telecommunication 
companies, in the joint-ownership structures of the Doraleh FTZ, closely mirrors the 
                                                            
31 See: Thierry Pairault,  Djibouti et les routes électroniques de la soie [missing English 
Translation], (Paris: EHESS  2017); Thierry Pairault, ‘La China Merchants à Djibouti : de la 
route maritime à la route numérique de la soie’, Revue Espace Géographique et Société 
Marocaine, [missing English Translation], No. 24-25, 2018 (REGSM: Rabat)  
32 On Bagamoyo, see: Léautier, F. Schaefer F. Wei Shen “The Port of Bagamoyo: A Test for 
China’s New Maritime Silk Road in Africa”, Diplomat.com, December 1, 2015,  missing 
access date, https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/the-port-of-bagamoyo-a-test-for-chinas-new-
maritime-silk-road-in-africa; Nick van Mead, ‘China in Africa: win-win development, or a 
new colonialism?’, The Guardian, July 31, 2018, accessed November 15, 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/jul/31/china-in-africa-win-win-development-or-a-
new-colonialism. 
33 ‘China Merchants Port to invest up to US$1.12b in Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port’, South 
China Morning Post, July 25, 2017, accessed September 15, 2018, 
https://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/2104080/china-merchant-port-invest-
us112b-sri-lankas-hambantota-port.  
34 Deng Yanzi, ‘CMG wants to make African port of Djibouti 'new Shekou'‘, China Daily, 
July 3, 2017, accessed 15 September 2018, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-
03/07/content_28455386.htm.  The notion of a “Shekou model” refers to the port suburb of 
Shenzen, the home of China Merchants Group in Guangdong. 
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development of Chinese commercial structures elsewhere in Africa.35  China’s blueprint for 
Djibouti as a key hub on the MSR was promoted vigorously to the government by CMG and 
the former vice-president of the World Bank, Lin Yifu, in December 2015. At the same time, 
CMG purchased a 15 percent stake in the digital data giant IPZ, who play a key role in 
China’s promotion of global e-payments systems. CMG and IPZ jointly formed “Silk Road 
E-Merchants” to promote a “Global Port Alliance”, a networked system of e-payments and 
container logistics linking 29 ports and 55 container terminals on the MSR. 36  Locally, it is 
Djibouti which hosts Africa’s first branch of the ‘International Silk Road Bank’ and a ‘Big 
Data Center’ run by IPZ.  
 
Djibouti and debt: MSR mismanagement rather than “predatory debt-diplomacy” in 
Africa?    
 
Studying the evolution of Djibouti’s debts provides some insight into the heated, broader 
debates over China’s alleged “debt diplomacy” and the BRI.   The speed and scale of China’s 
incorporation of diminutive Djibouti into the MSR framework clearly beg questions as to the 
financial sustainability of the commercial and concessional loans which Djibouti has 
contracted with China. However, Djibouti’s experience suggests that that debt leverage is not 
intentional tool of China’s BRI policies but reflects a lack of foresight and adequate planning 
by both African and Chinese sides.   
 
In 2016, total Djiboutian external debt stood at $2.3 billion; the IMF listing a further $5 
billion of planned investments within the ‘Vision 2035’ portfolio. All but one of these were 
Chinese projects, including $3 billion for the proposed Liquefied natural gas (LNG) pipeline 
from Ethiopia’s Ogaden region. 37  As noted earlier, the modalities of the financing the 
railway has been a regular source of unease between Beijing and Djibouti, with several 
wrangles, including a stop-gap ‘temporary’, $20 million debt-for-equity-swop to electrify the 
line, the details of which were agreed in August 2016.38  
 
In April 2017 the IMF highlighted that non-concessional loans from China were not 
sustainable given Djibouti’s fragile fiscal base. 39  By 2018, the level of indebtedness of 
                                                            
35 Pairault,  Djibouti et les routes électroniques de la soie, pp. 4-6. 
36 ThierryPairault, ‘La China Merchants à Djibouti … p. 72. In April 2019 Bloomberg 
reported that IPZ had withdrawn from Djibouti, being replaced by a CMG subsidiary. Nizar 




37 IMF, Djibouti: 2016 Article IV, Table 1, (Washington DC: IMF, April 6, 2017), p. 22. For 
a contextualization of debt see: ‘China, Djibouti, and the NYT: How Much Debt?’ Blogpost, 
SAIS-CARI, March 1, 2017, accessed January 20, 2019, China, Djibouti, and the NYT: How 
Much Debt?’ Blogpost, SAIS-CARI, March 1, 2017. 
38 In an interview with the author in April 2015, Aboubaker Omar Hadi, the head of the 
DFZPA was candid about the confusion over financing, suggesting that revenues from the 
railway would allow a buy-back of the shares conceded to the Chinese to pay for 
electrification.  
39 IMF, Djibouti: 2016 Article IV Consultation documents.  
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African states to China due to BRI projects had gained a far higher international profile for 
three reasons.  The most significant factor fueling allegations of “Debt Trap Diplomacy” on 
the MSR was the mid 2017 deal in which CMG obtained a 99-year lease on Sri Lanka’s 
indebted Hambantota in exchange for $1.12bn. This sum included CMG covering the Sri 
Lankan government’s outstanding debts on the project.  With Djibouti’s ports already part-
managed by China (via CMG’s minority holding in the Port Authority), and the government’s 
weak fiscal position, to critics Djibouti appears vulnerable to China taking a larger stake in 
the Port if the state is unable to service its debts.  The equation is compounded by Djibouti’s 
dispute with DPW over the management of the Doraleh Container Terminal, which 
culminated in Djibouti’s nationalization of the disputed container terminal in early 2018. This 
prompted many to conjecture that CMG or other Chinese groups would emerge as the 
eventual owners of the sequestered DPW shares, strengthening Chinese control of the Ethio-
Djibouti corridor. Any link between China and the dispute is denied by Djiboutian ministers, 
who also claim they will be able to repay Chinese debts. 40  No tangible evidence has been 
offered to support a link between the DPW dispute and a Chinese takeover, beyond CMG’s 
existing stake in the port authority and Djibouti’s lack of funds to purchase the DPW’s 
shares.   
 
The second reason for the focus on African debt and the BRI was that allegations of Chinese 
debt-diplomacy in Djibouti featured prominently in the US national security advisor John 
Bolton’s presentation of US African policy in December 2018.  Bolton denounced what he 
termed China’s “strategic use of debt to hold states in Africa captive to Beijing’s wishes”, 
claiming that: 
 
“[…] soon, Djibouti may hand over control of the Doraleh Container 
Terminal, a strategically-located shipping port on the Red Sea, to Chinese 
state-owned enterprises” adding. “Such predatory actions are sub-components 
of broader Chinese strategic initiatives, including “One Belt, One Road”—a 
plan to develop a series of trade routes leading to and from China with the 
ultimate goal of advancing Chinese global dominance.” 41 
 
Thirdly, the “debt-diplomacy” debate on BRI was further enflamed by the revelation in 
December 2018 that the Kenyan authorities had secretly pledged Beijing a stake in 
Mombassa port as security against the Nairobi-Mombassa railway project, a key BRI 
investment comparable to the Ethio-Djibouti railway link. A $2.3bn loan from Exim Bank to 
Kenya Railways Corporation was secured by offering China an equity stake in the profitable 
Kenya Port Authority in the event of default. 42  Again, there is little evidence either that 
                                                            
40 Chris Wright, ‘Africa: Why Djibouti’s China debt is raising the alarm’, Euromoney, 
January 7, 2019, accessed January 10, 2019, 
https://www.euromoney.com/article/b1clfx2rfvlhx6/africa-why-djiboutis-china-debt-is-
raising-the-alarm. 
41 Abdi Latif Dahir, ‘The Trump administration’s Africa policy is all about countering 
China’s influence’, Quartz Africa, December 14, 2018, accessed January 10, 2019, 
https://qz.com/africa/1495859/bolton-unveils-trump-africa-strategy-to-counter-china-russia. 
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KRC will default, or that China desires that outcome as an indirect way of acquiring port 
shares.  However, Kenya has a combative and investigative press, unlike Djibouti or 
Ethiopia, where the precise terms of Chinese contracts and debt have not been subject to 
public scrutiny. 
 
The muddled state of Djibouti’s financial ties with China, and the Kenyan scandal does raise 
the broader question of poor assessment of profitability and African states’ repayment 
capacities. This was noted in October 2018 at a BRI symposium in Hong Kong by a leading 
official at China’s Export and Credit Insurance Corporation, Sinosure, who suggested that 
that Sinosure might may be facing a $1bn loss on their loans to the Addis-Djibouti railway 
due to mismanagement. He stated that; “developers and financiers of projects in developing 
nations supported by Beijing’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ need to step up their risk 
management to avoid disaster.” 43  Although precise detailed are not in the public domain, 
discussions on the rescheduling of Ethiopian and Djiboutian railway debt began on the 
margins of the FOCAC 2018 summit.  
 
The Case of Djibouti and its Lessons for the MSRI 
 
This analysis has a number of important findings that have broader import for analysts of the 
MSRI/BRI and Chinese foreign policy and the BRI.  First, location does matter.  A country 
that is well placed strategically and/or economically is likely to garner a meaningful role in 
China’s MSRI as well as substantial Chinese FDI and infrastructure projects.  However, a 
state’s individual location does not tell the full story.  The situation in the neighborhood also 
matters.  To elaborate, in the Djibouti case, Djibouti gains added locational value because of 
its proximity to Ethiopia and key Ethiopian infrastructure.44  As far as China’s military base 
is concerned, location is a critical part of the story, but Djibouti itself became a suitable 
location for historical reasons, paradoxically because it had long experience of hosting 
French, US and EU military facilities.  In short, one should not automatically expect China to 
establish a military base in a MSRI participant’s state just because it is strategically located. 
 
Second, an authoritarian polity does not necessarily attract China.  While there appear to be 
certain advantages to dealing with a regime such as Guelleh’s, there is nothing to suggest this 
drove China to Djibouti.  Still, the Djibouti case underscores that authoritarian leaders have 
the ability to rapidly establish close economic and military ties with China, aided by the 
relative lack of democratic accountability, free press or credible opposition parties.  Of 
course, democratic regimes may embrace the MSRI too, but if they do and there is domestic 
opposition to the MSRI, or elections bring a change of government, then the situation for the 
MSRI will likely be more challenging as witnessed in the cases of Sri Lanka, Maldives and 
Malaysia, where incoming administrations sought to cancel or renegotiate BRI contracts.  
                                                            
43 Eric Ng, “Botched Chinese railway project in Africa is a warning to belt and road 
investors”, South China Morning Post, October 23, 2018, accessed October 30, 2018, 
https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/2170549/botched-chinese-railway-
project-africa-warning-belt-and. 
44 For additional discussion of the Ethiopia case, see Jean-Marc F. Blanchard’s piece in this 
special issue. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, ‘Problematic Prognostications about China’s Maritime 
Silk Road Initiative (MSRT): Lessons from Africa and the Middle East’, Journal of 
Contemporary China 29(122), (2019). 
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The general point is that we need to take into account domestic politics when thinking about 
birth and development of the MSRI in individual countries.45 
 
Third, “small” MSRI participants can wield agency.  In terms of domestic African political 
dynamics and the broader trajectory of the MSR, the text has suggested that MSRI states can 
wield a surprising degree of agency if the circumstances are supportive.  As for Djibouti, it 
has the ability to play off ostensibly rival foreign powers each seeking access to military 
facilities in proximity to the Bab al-Mandab’s geo-strategic location. Furthermore, it has an 
authoritarian President with extensive experience and skill in negotiating with great powers. 
 
Fourth, there seems to be a template model for MSRI ports.  As reported, CMG’s role in 
Djibouti corresponds to a fairly standard “one-size-fits-all approach” template to port and free 
zone development construction and finance used elsewhere on the MSR. Subsequent 
prospective port projects - most notably the blueprints for the vast port and free zone 
proposed in Bagamoyo, close to Zanzibar in Tanzania – support this finding. This view is 
supported by analyses of Chinese manufacturing in Africa. CMG’s role in a Chinese 
developmental state blueprint is also explicitly supported by Chinese advocates of such 
strategies, notably Justin Yifu Lin, who as we saw in section two, supported the Djibouti 
developments, played a key role in Ethiopia, and has since promoted such approaches more 
broadly in Africa.46  As to whether or not this template comes “from above” or CMG, it is 
hard to divide the two.  In Djibouti’s case the government’s own policy aims of enhancing 
the state’s role as a global maritime hub meshed closely with CMG’s belief that large-scale 
Chinese investment can loosely replicate a standard “template” drawn from the Shenzhen 
development model. Yet despite the creation of port, rail and free zone infrastructure the 
rapid economic transformation via a Shekou-type FTZ, transforming Djibouti into a “Shekou 
of East Africa” remains a highly improbable scenario even in the long-term.47  Reasons 
include prohibitively high utility costs, an arid climate, searing temperatures, the lack of a 
domestic labor force. These all inform Chinese companies’ preferences for highland 
Ethiopia’s Chinese-backed manufacturing zones.48 Thus Djibouti is likely to act essentially as 
a Chinese bridge to Ethiopia, remaining domestically essentially an entrepôt economy. 
                                                            
45 The crucial importance of domestic politics is stressed in Jonathan Fulton’s piece in this 
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Beyond the above, it should be noted that the Djibouti case does not suggest that ‘the 
Djibouti’s model,’ of a militarized naval facility alongside large (CMG-owned) civilian ports 
will be replicated elsewhere on the MSR. This is in part because Djibouti’s situation reflects 
four factors unique to it alone: these include its critical geostrategic location; the PLAN’s 
long-established presence in the region via anti-piracy activities; the relative ease of acquiring 
military facilities in a state with extensive experience of hosting foreign military bases; and a 
lack of alternative locations or receptive host states in Arabia and East Africa.  In short, it is 
premature to assume that the Doraleh base will be the first of a series of Chinese naval bases 
in the Indian Ocean, or indeed elsewhere in Africa.49  Despite much speculation, as of 2018 
there was scant evidence to suggest that Beijing was planning to replicate Djibouti’s naval 
facilities in West African ports; for example, in Namibia’s Walvis Bay or Cameroon’s Kribi, 
both of which host large new Chinese-constructed civilian port facilities.  
 
Nevertheless, even if China routinely denies any military dimension to the MSR, Djibouti’s 
experience indicates that one cannot understand China-Africa ties, or its decision to build a 
naval base in Djibouti, in abstraction from the PLA Navy’s role on the MSR and the Western 
Indian Ocean as a whole. Thus China’s presence (and the MSR) in Africa has to be examined 
in the context of shifts in global power relations on the high seas; it is easy to overlook that 
the MSR initiative is first and foremost maritime.  As noted in section three, China’s 2015 
Military Strategy white paper proposed a key strategic role for PLAN in protecting shipping 
lanes, anti-piracy operations and enhanced support roles for China’s UN peacekeeping 
missions; all of which feature in Djibouti’s role as a strategic hub on the MSR.  Similarly, 
PLAN’s expansion evidently corresponds to Xi Jinping’s promotion of a more globally 
assertive China. This in in turn partly explains the very considerable publicity accorded to 
Djibouti in Chinese policy discourse and media (which is objectively disproportionate given 
both how small Djibouti is, and how modest, relative to western powers’ facilities, the PLAN 
base is).  Unlike the US, EU and Japan who in general seek to keep their military and naval 
activities under wraps in Djibouti, it is striking that China widely publicized the opening of 
its base.50 The departure of the first troops for Djibouti, the base’s opening ceremony in 
August and the first ‘live-fire’ exercises in September 2017 all received extensive Chinese 
TV and news coverage. This underscores the degree to which the naval activities in and 
around Djibouti form an integral part of PLAN’s global ‘Blue Ocean’ soft power projection, 
for consumption both at home and abroad.51   
                                                            
s-success/; Philip Giannecchini, Ian Taylor, “The eastern industrial zone in Ethiopia: Catalyst 
for development?”, Geoforum 88, (2018), pp. 28-35. 
49 Gwaddar in Pakistan, and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, also built by CMG, are most often 
cited as potential naval facilities, something China strongly refutes.  ‘China Rejects 
Speculations About Use of Hambantota Port As Military Base China-Hambantota’, PLA 
Daily, April 16, 2017, accessed August 30, 2018, http://english.pladaily.com.cn/view/2018-
04/17/content_8006527.htm. 
50 On US secrecy, see: Craig Murphy, ‘Remote US base at core of secret operations’, 
Washington Post, October 26, 2012, accessed September 15, 2017, missing web link. 
51 Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange. ‘China’s Blue Soft Power: Antipiracy, 
Engagement, and Image Enhancement’, Naval War College Review, 68(1), (2015), pp. 71-91.  
Domestic awareness of China’s growing naval power and its Djibouti base was enhanced by 




While not a central analytical focus of this paper, the Djibouti case contributes to our thinking 
about the so-called debt-trap debate.  In this case, we do not find any evidence that exploiting 
debt leverage is an intentional Chinese policy. Rather debt for equity tradeoffs in the Djibouti 
case reflect a lack of foresight and adequate planning on both African and Chinese sides, 
which now prompt a reevaluation of the likely profitability and repayment terms on Chinese 
loans.  The most likely outcome of these debates is a more systematic Chinese approach to 
debt rescheduling. Thus following the 2018 FOCAC summit in Beijing, both Djibouti and 
Ethiopia appear to have obtained a significant restructuring of the debts associated with the 
construction of the Addis-Djibouti railway, extending repayment periods from 10 to 30 years.  
The relative ease with which China altered the terms to states perceived of as key partners 
within the MSRI again highlights Djibouti’s leverage in conjunction withEthiopia. It also 
suggests that comparisons with Hambantota are misplaced. 
 
Thinking forward, the Djibouti case is suggestive of the type of work that MSRI/BRI 
researchers might undertake.  More specifically, while synergies between Djibouti Ethiopia 
are central for China in the Horn, in time neighboring Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia and 
Somaliland may be integrated more closely with MSR investments along the Djibouti-
Ethiopia port-rail corridor.52  This suggests that a sub-regional level of analysis—as in the 
Horn of Africa here—may prove more insightful into MSR dynamics and Chinese 
companies’ strategies than looking at continents or broader regions.53  Aside from this, it may 
be worth researching commercial contradictions between at least two rail-port infrastructure 
‘corridor’ projects in East Africa; the Addis-Djibouti route on the one hand, and what appears 
as a rival scheme, the Lamu Port, South Sudan, Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSETT) 
route in Kenya on the other.54  These are presented by Beijing as complementary elements 
within a global MSR framework. However, viewed from East Africa, it appears the projects 
may be rivals for regional trade. There is also a broader question as to whether the Horn and 
East Africa requires such a significant increase in port and rail capacity, mindful of the 
proposed Bagamoyo port 200 miles further south of Lamu in Tanzania, in which China 
Merchants also has a stake. 
 
Notes on the Contributor: 
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53 For regional approaches, see; Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Colin Flint, ‘The Geopolitics of 
China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative’, Geopolitics 22(2), (2017), pp. 223-245; James 
Reardon-Anderson, The Red Star and the Crescent: China and the Middle East (London: 
Hurst 2018). See also the Journal of Contemporary China special issue: China’s Maritime 
Silk Road Initiative and Southeast Asia, Journal of Contemporary China 27(111), (2018). 
54 For details of the LAPSETT corridor see: [SEE comment box on fn 54], accessed 
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